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The image of the universe that science confronts us with is a state of 
constant evolution. Since Darwinian natural selection became success-
fully synthesised with Mendelian genetics into the current paradigm of 
evolutionary biology, an important role in the genealogy of life and man 
has been attributed to chance. The biological evolution involves not only 
chance encounters between biological organisms, but also mutations, that 
is, random changes in genetic material. The role of chance is additionally 
enhanced by the favoured interpretation of quantum mechanics according 
to which probabilities seem to lie fundamentally in the nature of things, 
and so are not only a measure of our ignorance. Michael Heller’s book 
entitled “Philosophy of Chance”* can be seen as an attempt to shed a light 
on the question of whether chance as we discover it in the physical world 
presents a real theological problem. Heller suggests that it does not, and 
argues that presenting the problem in the form of the alternative: “the 
world is either governed by God or by pure chance” is a new form of Man-
ichaeism in which “pure chance” takes on the role of anti-god.
* Heller, Michael. Philosophy of Chance: A Cosmic Fugue with a Prelude and a Coda. Cracow: 
Copernicus Center Press, 2013.
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For those who are interested in the relationship between science and 
religious faith Michael Heller does not need much presentation. The 2008 
Templeton Prize laureate was concisely described as “a cosmologist and 
Catholic priest who has developed sharply focused and strikingly original 
concepts on the origin and cause of the universe. He engages a wide range 
of sources in mathematics, philosophy, cosmology, and theology, allowing 
each fi eld to share insights that may inform the others without any vio-
lence to their respective methodologies”.1 The last phrase could accurately 
characterize also the spirit in which “Philosophy of Chance” was written. 
But before we come to ‘how it should be’, it would be instructive to recall 
some classic examples of how things can go wrong in the relation between 
science and religion.
The classical case is of course the reception of Darwin’s Theory of 
Evolution by natural selection, which Heller addresses. The theory has 
been strongly opposed by those who, among others, quite understandably, 
feel somehow unease at any suggestion that they might have something 
in common with gorillas (even though there has been growing scientifi c 
evidence that they do). Reasons why many people do not want to accept 
insights of modern biology are not genuinely scientifi c, but motivated by 
usage of religious texts for purposes they were not written for. Heller re-
minds us that it was Saint Augustine of Hippo who has already exposed at 
length, some 1600 years ago, that there can be no such thing as a wholly 
literal (in the sense later endorsed by fundamentalist movements), and at 
the same time consistent, reading of Genesis.2 And it is maybe worth ob-
serving that in fact the literal sense as understood by the Church is some-
thing quite different than the fundamentalist one. The literal sense is the 
meaning conveyed by the words and discovered by exegesis, following the 
rules of interpretation.3
1 http://www.templetonprize.org/previouswinner.html#top
2 St Augustine of Hippo, “De Genesi ad litteram.” See for example I, 19, 39 and II, 9, 20. 
Apart from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas we could mention here also names like Philo-
ponus, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza and Caesar Baronius.
3 See The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 116.
1(1) /2013 235
W H AT M AT H E M AT I C S CA N T E L L T H E O LO G Y
Heller goes on explaining that this form of resistance to scientifi c ev-
idence, motivated probably by the fear that the evidence can undermine 
one’s religious convictions, has adopted new forms: labelled in a scien-
tifi c-sounding way “Creation Science” or “Intelligent Design”. “Creation 
Science” puts God the Creator in opposition to pure chance, which is seen 
as irrational. In “Intelligent Design”, Heller diagnoses, the opposition is 
directed not so much at the theory of evolution itself, but at scientifi c nat-
uralism, i.e., the methodological rule stating that in explaining the natural 
world through science we should refer only to natural causes. The move-
ment cherishes complex phenomena in nature, but instead of exploring 
them, as genuine science would do, it says the phenomena cannot be ex-
plained by natural causes or by chance, due to “irreducible complexity”. 
The complexity is suggested to be a trace of “Intelligent Design”. Both 
“Creation Science” and “Intelligent Design” are examples of pseudo-sci-
ence: so constructed that no one can say what a counter-example for the 
theories would be (the Popper’s Criterion). Their aim is not an active explo-
ration of the world, but a defence of an agenda outside of science.
The ideologies infl ict much harm to the public debate between sci-
ence and religion. In popular understanding the theological doctrine of 
Creation has become associated with “Creation Science” or “Intelligent 
Design” and, in consequence, with anti-scientifi c backwardness. If the main 
idea of “Intelligent Design” were true, each time science made progress in 
exploring the complex phenomena cherished by the ideology as inexplica-
ble people who believe in God, as well as their faith, would be exposed to 
mockery. But at least maybe God would be seen as more and more intelli-
gent (inversely proportional to the size of the gaps in his ‘intelligent’ plan)!
Heller’s main argument in the book is that chance is not irrational, 
and therefore it is our prejudice, and not a real theological problem, that 
puts the theory of evolution at odds with the revelation. To develop his 
argument Heller presents philosophy of chance in historical perspective. 
The common perception that what happens regularly seems to be rational, 
and what is exceptional not, was formulated and settled in philosophy by 
Aristotle. Aristotle believed that chance breaks causal chains and thus 
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destroys rationality at its basis. For him “it is obvious why there can be no 
science of such a thing, because every science has as its object that which 
is so always or usually, and the accidental falls under neither of these 
descriptions” (Metaphysics, XI, 1065a)4. But Aristotle was in this point 
clearly wrong.
In our basic intuition we speak about chance when we are faced with 
an event which is very unlikely and yet happens. The little probability is 
related to the sense of surprise that we usually associate with the notion 
of chance. But when we think about it more closely, we see that we tend 
to mean by chance every event occurrence of which we are not sure in ad-
vance. Heller sketches how human scientifi c understanding of chance and 
probability has transformed throughout centuries, and gradually lost its 
tinge of irrationality. The long way began with collections of observations 
and anecdotes related to medicine, theological considerations on predes-
tination and the relation between human freedom and grace, and ethical 
speculations of Spanish casuists based on probabilistic argumentations. 
Further progress was motivated by will to order rationally one’s convictions 
which inspired enquiry about relations between evidence, estimation of 
probability and decision making, and puzzles related to gambling.
The mature mathematics of chance started in the year 1933 with the 
axiomatization given by Andrey Kolmogorov in Grundbegriffe der Wahr-
scheinlichkeitsrechnung. In the classical theory of probability as such there 
is nothing that would correspond to our feeling of surprise, expectation, or 
coincidence. The intuitions can be found in our interpretations of the theo-
ry: subjective (epistemic) and objective (ontological) interpretation. In the 
former, probability is a measure of our ignorance, in the latter, a measure of 
indetermination really occurring in the nature of an event. But even if we 
can not reduce probability only to our ignorance, and we accept that there 
are objective sources of probabilities, chance, Heller explains, does not 
destroy the order of nature. Nature apparently very often uses a strategy 
of cooperation between physical laws and chance.
4 Trans. by Hugh Tredennick.
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Through the book “Philosophy of Chance” run some big themes that 
continue to fascinate Heller. One of them is the question of philosophical 
and theological environment conducive to the development of sciences. 
The world of the Ancient Greeks found it hard to keep a balance between 
irrational and extremely rationalistic. The infl exible metaphysical doc-
trines such as “the same causes lead to the same effects”, as observed by 
Maxwell, do not fi nd confi rmation in science. A similar rigidity haunts the 
thinking of those who wade in logical contradictions of God’s omnipotence 
understood as ability to do anything. The God of Peter Damian, Al-Ghazali, 
Ibn Hazm and al-Razi is fi rst of all the Will. He can change even mathemat-
ical truths, what is right and wrong depend only on his wish and not on an 
objective order of things. He is not obliged to reveal to us what is true, he is 
able at his wish even to annihilate himself and he can order us to practise 
idolatry. This absolutist ruler, the Only Cause, rules an atomistic kingdom 
where there is no rhyme or reason: no connection between events, no cause 
and no effect–apart from His Majesty the Will. But where everything is 
a miracle, where all things have only one explanation, nothing can be really 
explained and the scientists gradually leave.
But God the Almighty can mean also the one who governs and sus-
tains everything in his providence through potestas ordinata. The God of 
Maimonides, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Peter Lombard and Aquinas cannot act 
unreasonably, is just and good and there are things he would never do. This 
God allows initiative in his realm, his providence does not exclude freedom 
of choice, fortune and chance; he is not the only cause. Because his power 
is ordered and his decisions rational, good and unchanging, it makes sense 
to try to decipher the Mind of this God. Because he is free, merely logical 
analyses of his creation lead nowhere. We have to observe the way the 
world is in order to work out the Mind.
One can see Heller’s passion for mathematics, and for what Eugene 
Wigner famously called “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathemat-
ics in the Natural Sciences”. For Heller the fact that the structure of the 
universe remains in such an effi cient correspondence with mathematical 
structures ought to be a subject of deep philosophical refl ection. He asks 
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with delight: is it not wondrous that real quantum processes are obedient 
to some abstract mathematical operations? And mathematics itself chang-
es: the fi eld of its applications ceases to be a domain of ordered structures 
and becomes, in Heller’s words, “a boiling ocean of dynamic structures” 
that can serve to model non-linear dynamic processes occurring in nature. 
Algebraization of the classic theory of probability, and then, as a conse-
quence, its generalization by means of the non-commutative von Neumann 
algebras, contributed to the mathematical structure of quantum mechan-
ics. With properties that are quite surprising from the point of view of our 
habits of thought, so strange and breaking through the barriers of preju-
dice, and with all the interpretational diffi culties that quantum mechanics 
poses for us, it can be modeled with mathematics! The discovery of Free 
Probability opens entirely new possibilities and indicates connections of 
probability with Noncommutative Geometry. But the noncommutative sets 
(under some additional assumptions) are characterized by the effective 
indiscernibility of their elements which poses the question whether we are 
not witnessing the coming of a new, post-Cantorian mathematics? Heller 
goes on asking what if the fundamental physical level is ruled by a noncom-
mutative version of probability theory?, and answers, that our understand-
ing of physics and of the world will need to be rebuilt. If noncommutative 
mathematical theories will force a revolution in the fundaments of math-
ematics, the changes will refl ect not only in the philosophy of physics, but 
in philosophy in general. The existence of noncommutative probability has 
lots to say to the physicists and philosophers. For example, that the classic 
theory of probability ought to be treated just as all other mathematical 
theories, and not as “precedent, explicative ontology” in relation to the 
laws of physics, and not as a meta-tool to speculate about the multiverse.
In this passion, the ability to ask questions and listen to different an-
swers, we fi nd marks of a true thinker and scientist. It is not easy to be 
really competent in mathematics and cosmology, philosophy and theology 
at the same time, and invite others to undertake serious intellectual en-
deavour in searching for balanced judgements. There is always a need for 
authors who prefer to leave questions open rather than to give ideological 
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answers. Michael Heller is one of them, and in this sense he is also an apol-
ogist of the religious faith of the best sort.
Augustine admonished the faithful to listen to well based evidence 
given by mathematicians and astronomers, if necessary purge personal 
faith from misconceptions about the revealed truth, and be careful not 
to use the Scriptures in vain. Aquinas established a paradigm of apolo-
getics: he gathered all the treasures of human thought he had access to 
and incorporated them in, at his time, a revolutionary system, in which all 
truths, among them presence of chance in the world, would fi nd a place 
and demonstrate that it is not unreasonable to believe in the Christian 
revelation. Priests – scientists, among them Michael Heller, teach us, that 
if the Church will be given at some point another Augustine or another 
Thomas, no doubt the new giant will have the same passion for truth, the 
ultimate things and discussion as the two had. But he, or she, will read far 
more than Augustine and Aquinas, study far more than their writings, and 
know about the natural world much more than they ever knew. And both 
Augustine and Thomas would be the fi rst to be happy about it.
